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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.  
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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JICM-346-52  
28 May 1952

029370/A

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE  
ADVISORY COMMITTEE

CTSC #2

GIA TSC NO.

Subject: National Policy on Counterintelligence  
and the Establishment of a Committee  
to Implement Such Policy

Enclosure: J.I.C. 562/15, Copy No. 8

1. On 27 May 1952 the Joint Intelligence Committee approved the draft report by the Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Enclosure to J.I.C. 562/15, copy of which is enclosed herewith. Concurrent with the foregoing action, the Joint Intelligence Committee agreed to forward this report to the Intelligence Advisory Committee requesting comment or concurrence, in order that the report, when submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may contain the views of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

2. Accordingly, the request by the Joint Intelligence Committee, dated 15 June 1951 (JICM-360-51), for comment on or concurrence with J.I.C. 566/1, is withdrawn, and the views of the Intelligence Advisory Committee on the enclosed report (J.I.C. 562/15) are requested.

OSD, DIA and JCS review(s)  
completed.

C. R. PECK  
Secretary

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J.I.C. 562/15

19 May 1952

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

on

NATIONAL POLICY ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMITTEE TO IMPLEMENT SUCH POLICY

References: a. J.I.C. 562/7/D  
b. J.I.C. 566/1  
c. J.I.C. 562/13

1. With the concurrence of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, who had already approved it, the draft report in J.I.C. 562/13 is withdrawn from consideration of the Joint Intelligence Committee by the ad hoc committee which prepared it. The ad hoc committee has prepared the enclosed draft revised report for submission to the Joint Intelligence Committee in lieu of J.I.C. 562/13.

2. Accordingly, the enclosed draft report, prepared by the ad hoc committee designated in J.I.C. 562/7/D, is submitted to the Joint Intelligence Committee for consideration.

3. The ad hoc committee recommends that:

a. Upon the approval of the enclosed report by the Joint Intelligence Committee, the report be forwarded to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for comment or concurrence, and that J.I.C. 566/1, which was forwarded to the Intelligence Advisory Committee

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for comment or concurrence by JICM-360-51 on 15 June 1951, be withdrawn from IAC consideration;

b. The Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee be invited to secure the comment on or concurrence with the enclosed report by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference prior to the submission of the report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

in order that the report, when submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may contain the views of both the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference on this report.

4. The suspense date for action by the individual members of the Joint Intelligence Committee on the enclosed draft report is set as not later than 27 May 1952.

C. R. PECK

W. T. Phillips

Joint Secretariat

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ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

REPORT BY THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NATIONAL POLICY ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMITTEE TO IMPLEMENT SUCH POLICY

References: a. J.C.S. 1735/68  
b. NSCID No. 5

THE PROBLEM

1. To prepare a separate report\* to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on counterintelligence, including Service recommendations for a U.S. policy on the division of counterintelligence responsibilities and functions between the U.S. military and civilian agencies.

DEFINITION

2. For the purposes of this paper, counterintelligence is defined as that aspect of intelligence relating to all security control measures, both active and passive, designed to insure the safeguarding of information, personnel, equipment and installations against the espionage, sabotage, or subversive activities of foreign powers and disaffected or dissident groups or individuals which constitute a threat to the national security.

\* Paragraph 19 of Enclosure "B" to  
J.C.S. 1735/68.

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FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B" hereto.

CONCLUSIONS

4. A national policy on counterintelligence is required.

5. The security of the United States requires the most effective utilization of all U. S. counterintelligence agencies.

Counterintelligence, very broadly, consists of military and civil security control measures. Neither the military nor the civilian agencies should be assigned exclusive responsibility for counterintelligence protection of United States interests but these agencies must receive coordinated guidance in terms of world-wide counterintelligence objectives, policies and plans.

6. A single instrumentality to coordinate effectively United States counterintelligence activities on a world-wide basis is required. Existing interdepartmental bodies are not properly constituted for this purpose.

7. An interdepartmental body should be established which would be responsible for the formulation of counterintelligence and security objectives, policies and plans.

8. The body referred to in paragraph 7 above (which might be termed the Interdepartmental Security Committee - ISC) should be under the National Security Council and should be composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Staff.

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RECOMMENDATION

2. It is recommended that the memorandum in Appendix "A" hereto be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

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APPENDIX "A"

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: National Policy on Counterintelligence  
and the Establishment of a Committee to  
Implement Such Policy

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the security of the United States requires the most effective utilization of all United States counterintelligence agencies and that a national policy on counterintelligence\* on a world-wide basis is required. The absence of such a policy delineating counterintelligence responsibilities between military and civilian agencies of the U.S. Government permits gaps in counterintelligence coverage, results in duplication of effort, and makes cooperation with friendly nations exceedingly difficult.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further consider that an inter-departmental body to implement the counterintelligence policy is required. Neither the military nor the civilian agencies should be assigned exclusive responsibility for counterintelligence protection of United States interests but these agencies must receive coordinated guidance in terms of world-wide counterintelligence objectives, policies and plans. Existing interdepartmental bodies are not properly constituted for this purpose because of:

\* Counterintelligence is that aspect of intelligence relating to all security control measures, both active and passive, designed to insure safeguarding of information, personnel, equipment and installations against the espionage, sabotage, or subversive activities of foreign powers and disaffected or dissident groups or individuals which constitute a threat to the national security.

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a. Incomplete representation of all agencies which have an interest in the policy proposed in paragraph 1 above.

(The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) lacks Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and Atomic Energy Commission representation and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) lacks Central Intelligence Agency and Atomic Energy Commission representation.)

b. Limitation to U.S. internal security matters. (IIC and ICIS)

c. Emphasis on advisory functions and the absence of a permanent working staff. (The Intelligence Advisory Committee.)

3. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

a. A single U.S. instrumentality responsible for the formulation of counterintelligence objectives, policies and plans to support current and projected U.S. interests should be established.

b. This body should be an interdepartmental committee (which might be termed the Interdepartmental Security Committee) under the National Security Council. It should be composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Staff.

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4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend, if you concur, that the substance of the enclosed draft memorandum (Annex) be forwarded to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council.

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A N N E X

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: National Policy on Counterintelligence  
and the Establishment of a Committee to  
Implement Such Policy

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that the security of the United States requires the most effective utilization of all United States counterintelligence agencies and have recommended the formulation of a national policy on counterintelligence\* on a world-wide basis. Subsequent to the adoption of such a policy, an interdepartmental body to implement the policy would be required since neither military nor civilian agencies should be assigned exclusive responsibility for counterintelligence protection of United States interests. Existing interdepartmental bodies are not properly constituted to provide United States counterintelligence agencies coordinated guidance in terms of world-wide counterintelligence objectives, policies and plans because of:

- a. Incomplete representation of all agencies which have an interest in the policy proposed above. (The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) lacks

\* Counterintelligence is that aspect of intelligence relating to all security control measures, both active and passive, designed to insure safeguarding of information, personnel, equipment and installations against the espionage, sabotage, or subversive activities of foreign powers and disaffected or dissident groups or individuals which constitute a threat to the national security.

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Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and Atomic Energy Commission representation and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) lacks Central Intelligence Agency and Atomic Energy Commission representation.)

b. Limitation to U.S. internal security matters.  
(IIC and ICIS)

c. Emphasis on advisory functions and the absence of a permanent working staff (The Intelligence Advisory Committee.)

2. Therefore, it is recommended that:

a. A single U.S. instrumentality responsible for the formulation of counterintelligence objectives, policies and plans to support current and projected U.S. interests be established.

b. This body be an interdepartmental committee (which might be termed the Interdepartmental Security Committee) under the National Security Council to be composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Staff.

3. I would appreciate it if you would initiate action within the National Security Council to effect the proposals contained in the draft directive attached hereto (Tab).

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TAB TO ANNEX

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Secretary of the Army  
The Secretary of the Navy  
The Secretary of the Air Force  
The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director, Atomic Energy Commission

Subject: National Policy on Counterintelligence  
and the Establishment of a Committee  
to Implement Such Policy

Pursuant to Section 101(a) of the National Security Act of  
1947, and NSC \_\_\_\_\_\*, as approved by the President, the National  
Security Council (NSC) hereby:

a. Declares that the security of the United States  
requires the most effective utilization of all United  
States counterintelligence agencies.

b. Defines counterintelligence as that aspect of  
intelligence relating to all security control measures,  
both active and passive, designed to insure safeguarding  
of information, personnel, equipment and installations  
against the espionage, sabotage or subversive activities  
of foreign powers and disaffected or dissident groups or  
individuals which constitute a threat to the national  
security.

c. Declares that no single agency will be assigned

\* NSC Short title series assigned to Annex hereto.

the exclusive counterintelligence responsibility for protecting all United States interests.

d. Authorizes and directs the establishment under the National Security Council of the Interdepartmental Security Committee (ISC) which shall formulate U.S. counter-intelligence objectives, policies and plans to support current and projected U.S. interests on a world-wide basis. The ISC shall be guided by the terms of this charter.

(1) Organization

(a) The ISC shall be composed of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; Director of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force; Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Director of Central Intelligence; Director, Atomic Energy Commission and Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff.

(b) The Chairman shall be elected annually by a majority vote of the ISC from among its members. The incumbent shall not be eligible to serve a successive term.

(c) A permanent working staff shall be provided by the Department of State, the military

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Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency to discharge on a continuing basis the duties assigned it by the ISC.

(d) The ISC, through its Chairman, shall invite non-member agency representatives to sit with the committee on an ad hoc basis when matters involving the responsibilities of such agencies are under consideration.

(e) A representative designated by the NSC and under the direction of the Executive Secretary of the NSC shall participate as an observer and adviser in all meetings of the ISC.

(2) Functions. The ISC shall take the necessary action to:

(a) Advise the National Security Council on U.S. counterintelligence matters on a world-wide basis.

(b) Define U.S. counterintelligence objectives and policies in consonance with U.S. current and projected interests.

(c) Develop counterintelligence plans in consonance with U.S. foreign policy as well as with U.S. military plans.

(d) Assess counterintelligence capabilities of all military and civilian agencies in order that counterintelligence projects may be assigned or

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realigned between individual agencies or combinations of agencies in accordance with those capabilities.

(e) Coordinate counterintelligence problems with U.S. agencies which are not ISC members.

(f) Serve as a point of contact with foreign national and international counterintelligence organizations.

(3) Staff. The permanent working staff of the ISC shall consist initially of two officer or civilian specialists in counterintelligence (with appropriate clerical personnel) from each of the following: the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(4) Procedure.

(a) The ISC shall submit to the NSC reports which require consideration or action by the NSC and those problems which cannot be resolved and worked out through cooperative consideration and action.

(b) The ISC shall coordinate its activities closely with the IIC, the ICIS and the IAC through the Chairman of the ISC.

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APPENDIX "B"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

1. The Joint Intelligence Committee concluded, on 15 June 1951, that there is an immediate need for a U.S. policy on the division of counterintelligence responsibilities between the U.S. civilian and military intelligence agencies in theaters of operations during hostilities. It was further concluded that a committee, including representatives of all U.S. agencies which would have counterintelligence responsibilities in a theater of operations during hostilities, should be established in time of peace to formulate and coordinate U.S. counterintelligence policies and plans.

2. The U.S. military delegation which attended a Civil Security and Counterespionage Conference at SHAPE in October, 1951 concluded that the absence of an official delineation of responsibility between U.S. military and civilian agencies for counterintelligence planning and operations in areas of military jurisdiction and interest continues to impede proper consideration of U.S. counterintelligence planning and operations.

3. NSCID 5, revised 28 August 1951, is the basic directive governing the conduct of federal counterespionage operations. However, it states in paragraph 2 that the authority delegated to the Director of Central Intelligence to conduct federal counterespionage operations "shall not be construed to preclude the counterintelligence activities of any army, navy or air command

or installation and certain agreed activities by departments and agencies necessary for the security of such organizations." It states further in paragraph 10 that "in time of war or when the President directs, the Director of Central Intelligence will coordinate espionage and counterespionage operations in or from a theater of active military operations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff." This paragraph further states that "in active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence conducting espionage and counter-espionage in or from the theater shall be under the direct command of the U.S. Theater Commander."

4. The United States has assumed world-wide commitments as a result of the global threat to United States interests and these commitments require that United States counterintelligence be strengthened.

5. NSCID 5 does not provide for the over-all direction and guidance of U.S. counterintelligence activity under all circumstances and in all areas. The United States has no fully coordinated counterintelligence system.

6. Although many U.S. agencies have valuable counterintelligence contributions to make to the protection of world-wide U.S. interests, at the present time there are only individual agreements allocating counterintelligence responsibilities to these agencies. This condition does not insure adequate counterintelligence protection. To be effective, efforts of all U.S. agencies in this field must be fully coordinated.

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7. To protect its interests, the United States follows a national policy of cooperation with friendly nations. This cooperation must extend into the field of counterintelligence. The United States is at a disadvantage in this field without a uniform counterintelligence organization and policy, since individual U.S. agencies cannot deal effectively at international levels.

8. The following are some aspects of counterintelligence:

- a. Counterespionage
- b. Countersabotage
- c. Countersubversion
- d. Countering treason, sedition and disaffection
- e. Communications security
- f. Camouflage security
- g. Security control
  - (1) Censorship
  - (2) Control of military personnel and civilian population
  - (3) Port, frontier, commerce and travel control
  - (4) Plant protection and security of military installation
- h. Counterintelligence procedures
  - (1) Investigation
  - (2) Collection, evaluation, analysis, interpretation and dissemination of counterintelligence information

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(3) Apprehension, interrogation, exploitation and disposition of known or suspected enemy agents

(4) Preparation of estimates of vulnerability to espionage, sabotage and subversion

(5) Preparation of handbooks, studies and reports on foreign intelligence personnel, organizations and activities.

To be prepared for war, the counterintelligence system must be functioning effectively and efficiently in time of peace. Once hostilities begin, it will be too late to establish a world-wide system which should already have given the alert in time for the most effective deployment of forces.

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
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11. Interdepartmental bodies do exist which are designed to coordinate intelligence and internal security matters. However, these existing interdepartmental bodies do not fulfill the requirement of effective coordination of U.S. counterintelligence objectives, policies and plans to support current and projected U.S. interests on a world-wide basis due to:

a. Incomplete representation of all agencies which have an interest in U.S. counterintelligence on a world-wide basis. (The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) lacks Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency and Atomic Energy Commission representation, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) lacks Central Intelligence Agency and Atomic Energy Commission representation.)

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b. Limitation to internal security matters.

(IIC and ICIS).

c. Emphasis on advisory functions and the absence of a permanent working staff (The Intelligence Advisory Committee).

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JIC 562/15

11 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee

SUBJECT : National Policy on Counter-intelligence  
and the Establishment of a Committee to  
Implement Such Policy

1. This will acknowledge receipt of JICM-346-52  
(enclosing JIC 562/15) on the above subject, addressed to  
the Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee.

2. In view of the DCI's interest and responsibility  
with regard to these activities, this Agency is making a  
thorough study of the JIC proposals and is reviewing  
current practice in this field. At the conclusion of  
this study CIA will be in a better position to discuss the  
matter.

Concurrence:

LOFTUS E. BECKER  
Deputy Director/Intelligence

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Dist.: Orig. & 1 - addressee  
1 - OIC  
1 - EA/DCI  
1 - Exec. Reg.  
2 - [unclear]

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MEMORANDUM FOR: GEORGE - SMITH

You will recall that at the morning meeting last Thursday you indicated a desire to see the US JIC report recommending establishment of an interdepartmental committee under NSC to formulate counterintelligence objectives, policies, and plans.

*JIC 567/15*  
Attached is the JIC report, on which IAC views have been requested prior to JCS consideration of the report.

Mr. Tulles and Mr. Wisner have copies.

*200 copy in JCS file*

LEB

9 June 1952  
(DATE)

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